Why the freight industry is going to Washington

where the gaps start

Once access is granted, the rest of the process assumes legitimacy. Freight is tendered, communication begins, and control changes hands. By the time inconsistencies appear, the load is already moving, which limits the available response. Fraud does not require bypassing the system. It operates within it.

The scale of the system makes consistent oversight difficult. There are roughly 327,000 motor carriers operating today, along with tens of thousands of brokers and freight forwarders. Oversight is handled by approximately 350 federal officers, making comprehensive review unrealistic. At the current pace, it would take decades to fully inspect and rate all companies, and about 94% do not have a safety rating.

Data inconsistencies add to the challenge. More than 177,000 companies show conflicting authority status depending on the system being used. In some cases, systems that should align do not communicate, creating uncertainty at critical decision points.

Regulatory frameworks exist, but enforcement cannot keep pace with the rate of entry and activity. The system often relies on assumptions where verification is needed, and accountability tends to come after the fact.

tools help, but they don’t fix the problem

The industry has responded by building tools to improve visibility. Vetting platforms, monitoring systems, and risk detection tools have helped identify issues more quickly and provide better insight into potential risk. These tools are valuable, but they do not address the core issue.

In our conversation, fraud was described as often being the result of process breakdowns rather than technology failures. Missed steps, incomplete verification, and decisions made without full context create openings. Technology can support stronger decisions, but it does not replace the need for consistent processes.

There is also a structural limitation. Many platforms operate independently and do not consistently share data. This creates gaps between systems. As Prax described, bad actors move between platforms and take advantage of these seams. If one system identifies an issue and another does not, the risk continues to move rather than being eliminated.

why the industry is going to Washington

When we discussed the trip to Washington, DC, Prax made an important distinction. This is not a general group of industry leaders meeting with government officials. It is a specific group of competitors made up of people from onboarding, vetting, and compliance, those working directly with identity, authority, and access on a daily basis.

That distinction matters because the focus is not on what happens after a problem occurs. It is on how companies get into the system in the first place. The issue sits at the foundation, and no single company can address it alone. The purpose of the meeting is not just alignment but understanding where responsibility sits across the system.

Both sides are working within real limitations. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration does not have the ability to verify identity in real time across every entry point, which is the reality of operating at this scale. At the same time, the industry has developed capabilities that allow for real-time identity checks, affiliation mapping, and early risk detection. The gap exists because neither side controls the full solution.

Another key issue is the lack of coordination between platforms. The gaps are not only between the industry and the government. They also exist between onboarding and vetting systems themselves. Without shared signals and consistent data flow, risk is not removed. It shifts from one platform to another.

The numbers help explain the urgency. Truck-related incidents account for roughly 5,000 deaths each year, which is comparable to dozens of planes crashing annually. At the same time, the agency responsible for trucking operates on a budget of around $1 billion, compared to roughly $25 billion for aviation. The size of the system and the resources behind it are not aligned, which makes it harder to address risk at the level the system now requires.

The focus of these discussions is entry into the system, identity verification, and the movement of information across platforms. The objective is to reduce exposure before a bad actor gains access.

what this means going forward

For brokers, carriers, and shippers, this is an operational issue. It affects how freight is covered, how partners are selected, and how risk is managed. It also adds cost through verification efforts, issue resolution, and ongoing monitoring.

Cargo theft and freight fraud are often viewed as isolated events. They reflect how the system functions. The industry was designed for speed, and that design created openings that can be exploited.

What we see today is only a portion of what is actually there. Cargo theft and freight fraud remain a multi-billion-dollar issue moving through a trillion-dollar system

Click here for more articles on cargo theft and freight fraud by Phillip Brink.